Top distributions of income and wealth are still incompletely measured in many national statistics, particularly when using survey data.
DOCTOR SCIDA LONG ISLAND FREE
A Free and Fair Economy: A Game of Justice and Inclusion (C7, D7) We also find that mark-to-market price feedbacks have considerable adverse impact on the stability of the system, while that the mutualization of losses has a strong stabilizing effect. In addition, a CCP mitigates contagion measured by lower amount of 2nd-round defaults. We find that in a system with a single CCP overall less defaults occur than in a system without a CCP.
We compare the stability of the networks with and without a CCP by analyzing i) endogenous feedback effects between CM defaults and market liquidity, ii) the contagion to non-defaulting CM as well as iii) the contagion from service functions that CMs provide to the CCPs, such as liquidity provision or collateral and investment services. Moreover, we analyze the stability of the network of counterparties in a system with and without a CCP. We also model the margin shortfalls and the entire default waterfall in case of CM defaults. We simulate the balance sheets and the leverage of the CCP and the CMs as a result of the market price movements. Agents are profit optimizing and are exposed to market risk. We put forward a partial equilibrium model of a central counterparty (CCP) and clearing members (CM).
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